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TWO WRONGS? CORRECTING PROFESSOR LAZARUS’S
MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
BY
MICHAEL C. BLUMM*

This paper responds to Professor Richard Lazarus’s recent and
longstanding criticisms of the public trust doctrine, claiming that
Richard misunderstands the nonabsolutist nature of the doctrine,
which seeks accommodation between public and private property.
Although he acknowledges the value of the public trust doctrine as a
defense to claims of private takings, he thinks that the “background
principles” defense it affords government regulators is a static doctrine.
And he fails to see that the public trust doctrine hardly equips courts
with the authority to displace legislative and administrative decision
makers. Instead, as epitomized in the well-known Mono Lake decision,
the doctrine—an inherent limit on all sovereigns—requires those more
representative branches to exercise their discretion in protecting trust
resources from monopolization or destruction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Richard Lazarus is one of the leading lights of modern environmental
law. His book, Making Environmental Law,1 should be required reading for
anyone interested in the evolution of modern environmental law. He is
without a doubt the leading academic analyst of the Supreme Court’s
environmental decisions, and his close following of the Court’s decisions is a

* Jeffrey Bain Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School.
1 RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004).
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busy law professor’s lifeline to the Court.2 I have known Richard for nearly
thirty years, and I always pay attention to what he says and writes. And I
almost always agree with him.
But he not only got the public trust doctrine (PTD) wrong on his tenure
piece thirty years ago,3 he has still got it wrong.4 Worse, he is unrepentant
about his error.5 Over the years, he has moved from the law schools at
Washington-St. Louis to Georgetown to Harvard, so he is not someone with
whom you quarrel lightly. But, since I am associated closely with the PTD,6 I
must because—given Richard’s prominence—he could do more damage
than he’s already done to a doctrine that I don’t believe he has studied it in
sufficient depth.
Both Richard and I are deeply indebted to the legacy of Joe Sax, the
patron saint of the modern PTD.7 Richard made clear his debt throughout his
recent article,8 and my coauthors and I dedicated our recent Natural
Resources Law casebook to Joe.9 But Joe was spot-on about Richard’s
conclusions about the PTD: he was, in Joe’s words, “utterly wrong.”10
Regrettably, he remains so. Although Richard might not be “hopelessly
naïve,” as I once alleged,11 he is still way off-base. I want to use this space to
explain why.
2 I count myself among those who depend upon Richard’s analysis of the Court. He often
posts his opinions on the invaluable law professors’ listserve, envlawprofessors@
lists.uoregon.edu.
3 Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986) [hereinafter
Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property].
4 Richard J. Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, Legislative Dysfunction, and the Public Trust
Doctrine: Can Two Wrongs Make a Right?, 45 ENVTL. L. 1139 (2015) [hereinafter Lazarus,
Judicial Missteps]. Richard made a similar presentation at the Environmental Law symposium
on the PTD held at Lewis & Clark Law School in April 2015. The other papers presented at the
conference are published at 45 ENVTL. L. 257–640 (2015).
5 Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, supra note 4, at 1152–61 (explaining how he “would not refine
[his] thinking” about the PTD).
6 See MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW (2d ed. 2015).
7 See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) [hereinafter Sax, Natural Resource Law];
Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 185 (1980); Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473
(1989). Sax’s influence was not confined to the PTD in the United States. See Michael C. Blumm
& Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and
Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
741 passim (2012) (surveying the PTD abroad).
8 Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, supra note 4, at 1140–41, 1160–62.
9 ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, MICHAEL C. BLUMM & BLAKE HUDSON, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW:
PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, at iii, viii (2015). Looking back, I acknowledge that I
acquired an enormous number of my ideas from Joe. Although I cited him a lot, I should have
cited him more often, since he influenced my thinking so much. I often think about what Joe
would say about the problems brought to me. Maybe that is the greatest tribute of all.
10 See Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, supra note 4, at 1143 n.18 (quoting Joe’s tenure evaluation
of Richard).
11 Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: A
Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 593 n.98 (1989) [hereinafter Blumm,
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In order to do so, I need to briefly outline the contours of the PTD. In
this country, the doctrine grew up in the nineteenth century around the idea
of protecting public access to water resources in an era where
transportation by road was difficult and by rail was either unavailable or not
subject to price competition.12 Public property rights in streams were
therefore essential to widespread participation in the developing market
economy, and the PTD ensured that those crucial resources were not
subjected to monopoly rents.13 Thus, the PTD was consonant with a populist
agenda of the mid-1800s that promoted widespread distribution of land
ownership through the federal legislation, and looked skeptically on
unbridled accumulation of private wealth.14
The PTD’s antimonopolization and widespread distribution impulses
today coexist with its environmental role because the PTD has never been
an exclusively ownership doctrine—it emphasizes public uses as well.15 This
public easement aspect of the PTD means that the PTD is not so much a
threat to private property as a means of curtailing private rights that damage
public uses. In fact, the roots of the PTD’s environmental role also may be
traced to the nineteenth century in the form of state sovereign ownership of
wildlife, which was the fulcrum of state wildlife regulation, and was

Public Property]. I now acknowledge that my article was also “hopelessly naïve” concerning my
prediction that the decision in National Audobon Society v. Superior Lake (Mono Lake), 658
P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), would lead to what I thought would be a large PTD effect on Western
water law. Id. at 597–600. Only Hawaii fully endorsed the application of the PTD to water rights.
In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000). And even in
California, the effect of the PTD has been difficult to determine. See Dave Owen, The Mono
Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099,
1103–05 (2012) (finding, after reviewing administrative and court decisions, that the PTD in
California water decision making has had most of its influence at the administrative level, with
little evidence of PTD influencing the courts).
12 See, e.g., Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property, supra note 3, at 636 (“Commerce
was primarily waterborne; the rivers served as highways for pioneers and supplied power for
industry. Accordingly, cities and towns invariably lined major waterways, and natural ports
were a prerequisite to developing a major metropolitan area.”); Charles F. Wilkinson, The

Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and the Scope of the Traditional
Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 431–33 (1989) (footnotes omitted) (“[I]t is hard to overstate the
importance of the major watercourses during the formative years of the United States. To the
early settlers, the rivers furnished paths of exploration and avenues for the fur trade and log
floats. Due to the density of the forests and the difficulty of road construction, the watercourses
afforded logical areas for settlement. Fishing was significant, both for commercial and
subsistence purposes.”); PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REGULATION: THE TRUNKLINE RAILROAD CARTELS AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION BEFORE 1900, at 13–14
(1965) (discussing railroad cartels in the 1800s).
13 Michael C. Blumm & Kara Tebeau, Antimonopoly in American Public Land Law, 28 GEO.
ENVTL. L. REV. 155, 189–90 (2016).
14 See id. at 169–73 (discussing, inter alia, the Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392,
and the Preemption Act of 1841, ch. 16, 5 Stat. 453, repealed by General Revision Act of 1891,
ch. 561, § 4, 26 Stat. 1095, 1097).
15 Blumm, Public Property, supra note 11, at 580–82.
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judicially ratified in cases like Geer v. Connecticut.16 State sovereign
ownership, properly understood, is a fundamental aspect of the PTD.
Richard does not see the important role for the PTD in either its
antimonopolization or environmental protection roles, although he does
acknowledge its value as a defense to regulatory takings claims.17 His
mistakes were basically three: 1) he thinks the PTD is absolutist—it is not;
2) he thinks the Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council18 decision’s
reference to “background principles,” which serve as a defense to takings
claims, and which clearly include the PTD, is a reference to static property
principles—it was not; and 3) he thinks that the PTD usurps legislative and
executive prerogatives—it clearly does not. I explain each of Richard’s
errors below.
II. THE NONABSOLUTIST NATURE OF THE PTD
Richard seems to think that the PTD is objectionable because it
imposes “absolutist notions of property rights.”19 You hear this often from
the libertarian crowd, which views the PTD as a threat to private property.20
It is just not true, as I have tried to show: the PTD and private property can
and do coexist. What the PTD demands is an accommodation of both public
and private rights in property. As I once wrote:
Some libertarians see application of the public trust doctrine as an evisceration
of private property rights. In reality, such claims are hyperbolic. The doctrine
actually functions to mediate between public and private rights, and thus is
hardly the antithesis of private property; instead, it functions to transform, not
21
eradicate, private property rights.

Richard’s assumption that the PTD is absolute is just as wrong as the
libertarians’ view. A good example is the famous National Audubon Society
v. Superior Court (Mono Lake)22 case. There, the California Supreme Court
hardly viewed the PTD as absolutist, directing the state to “exercise

16 161 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1896) (upholding a state wildlife statute prohibiting the transport of
legally caught game after the hunting season on state sovereign ownership grounds), overruled
by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
17 Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, supra note 4, at 1150–52.
18 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
19 Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, supra note 4, at 1141.
20 See, e.g., Randy T. Simmons, Property and the Public Trust Doctrine, 39 PROP. & ENV’T
RES. CENTER POL’Y SERIES 13 (Roger Meiners, ed. 2007) (charging that the PTD equips judges
and legislatures with the power to reduce property rights at the whims of changing public
perceptions; and charging that the effect of the PTD on private property eliminates the
fundamental right to exclude, and, without that right, property devolves into the open access
commons from which it emerged, leading to inevitable overuse of resources and environmental
destruction).
21 Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property: The Accommodation
Principle, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 649, 650 (2010) [hereinafter Blumm, The Public Trust
Doctrine] (footnotes omitted).
22 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
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continuous supervision” of diversionary water rights in order to ensure
consideration of the ecological values protected by the public trust.23 The
court did not rule that the public trust uses trump appropriated water rights,
but it did direct the state to protect public trust uses “whenever feasible” to
achieve both the economic value of the diversions and the ecological values
of the lake and its feeder streams.24 In implementing the court’s directive, the
state water board decided to try to partially restore the lake’s level by
cutting back on the diversions, but it did not eliminate them.25 The
accommodation the state reached over a decade later, in 1994, benefitted
both the lake and the water supply situation in Los Angeles, where the
court’s decision helped to revolutionize the city’s approach to water
management and use.26
In short, the Mono Lake court’s interpretation of the PTD as requiring
an accommodation of PTD values through a publicly reviewable balancing
process produced a win-win situation. This balancing hardly reflected an
absolutist view of property.
Nor was Mono Lake an unusual decision. As I have tried to show
elsewhere, the PTD has provided a mediating force in numerous other
cases.27 Courts have, for example, divided ownership conceptually into
distinct public and private estates, the so-called jus privatum and jus
publicum; they have authorized small privatizations of trust resources that
don’t substantially adversely affect trust values; they have interpreted what
were thought to be fees simple to be determinable fees; and they have found
public easements that burden other private fees simple.28 In none of these
cases were private rights disregarded. There was no “absolute” public right
that eviscerated private rights. Richard’s assumption about the absolute
nature of the PTD is simply misguided.
III. THE NONSTATIC NATURE OF “BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES” AS A TAKINGS
DEFENSE
Richard does see the value of the PTD as a useful defense to regulatory
takings claims.29 The Lucas decision, no doubt unintentionally, actually
provided a powerful defense to government regulators through its
recognition of “background principles of nuisance and property law.”30
But Richard’s criticism of Lucas misinterpreted the decision as
reflecting a static view of property rights.31 Perhaps Justice Scalia, author of
23
24
25
26

Id. at 712.
Id. at 728.
See BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 6, at 183.
Madeleine Nash, The Tenuous Revival of Mono Lake, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS Nov. 25, 2015,

http://www.hcn.org/issues/47.20/the-tenuous-revival-of-mono-lake (last visited July 16, 2016).
27 Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 21, at 650–55.
28 Id. at 658–65 (collecting cases).
29 Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, supra note 4, at 1150.
30 Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992).
31 Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, supra note 4, at 1150 (“Justice Scalia’s majority opinion for
the Court in Lucas is rooted in nonsensical static notions of property law . . . .”).
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Lucas, did view property rights as being static, but his Lucas opinion ratified
a dynamic vision of property law in state courts. The “background
principles” it authorized as an exception to the per se takings rule that the
case established was hardly a recognition of static property rights.32 Instead,
it incorporated state nuisance law and property law as interpreted by state
courts.33 As Richard himself recognized, nuisance law has always been
dynamic in nature, evolving over time.34 So property law, like the PTD, can
evolve.35 One effect of the Lucas decision was, as Richard understood, to rule
that environmental regulations that merely codify the common law take no
private property rights.36 In fact, the background principles exception of
Lucas has been more influential than the per se takings rule the case
announced.37 Thus, the real effect of the case hardly has been to establish a
static vision of property law, as Richard alleged.38
32 Lucas established a categorical takings rule for landowners affected by regulations
which produce complete economic wipeouts, the loss of “all beneficial value,” 505 U.S. at 1019
n.8, but authorized an exception where a regulation merely replicates “background principles”
of state property and nuisance law, as defined by state courts. 505 U.S. at 1031–32.
33 Id. at 1031–32.
34 Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, supra note 4, at 1150.
35 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
36 Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, supra note 4, at 1150.
37 See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of
Background Principles in Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 322 (2005)
(“[T]he Lucas legacy represents one of the starkest recent examples of the law of unintended
consequences. For rather than heralding in a new era of landowner compensation or
government deregulation, Lucas instead spawned a surprising rise of categorical defenses to
takings claims in which governments can defeat compensation suits . . . .”); see also John D.
Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principles Defense in Takings
Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931, 945 (2012) (“[T]he Lucas decision has turned out to have
greater impact than most observers originally anticipated insofar as courts have relied heavily
on the background principles concept to reject takings claims.”).
38 It is true that in Lucas, Justice Scalia suggested that the “background principles” defense
could be cabined by “objectively reasonable” interpretations of the state’s property and
nuisance precedents, 505 U.S. at 1032 n.18, but no federal court has found a state court’s
interpretation to fail that test. In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702 (2010), four members of the Court joined Justice Scalia
in suggesting that a judicial interpretation could produce a compensable taking. Id. at 730; see
Michael C. Blumm & Elizabeth B. Dawson, The Florida Beach Case and the Road to Judicial
Takings, 35 WM. & MARY. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 713, 716 (2011) (discussing the judicial takings
doctrine). But that possibility also has not resulted in any compensable takings.
An example of a prominent background principle of state property law is the state
sovereign ownership of wildlife doctrine, which nearly every state has recognized. See Michael
C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437, 1488–504
(including citations to 48 state claims of sovereign ownership). The Supreme Court recently
gave a surprising endorsement to the sovereign wildlife ownership in Horne v. Department of
Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015), distinguishing a compensable takings of raisins in the
context of a government price-control program from a similar program involving oysters. Id. at
2431 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Raisins are not like oysters; they are private
property—the fruit of the growers’ labor—not public things subject to the absolute control of
the state.”); see also John D. Echeverria & Michael C. Blumm, Horne v. Department of
Agriculture: Expanding Per Se Takings While Endorsing State Ownership of Wildlife, 75 MD. L.
REV. 657, 696–97 (2016) (discussing the Court’s surprising ratification of the sovereign wildlife
trust doctrine).
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IV. THE NONINTRUSIVE NATURE OF THE PTD ON EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE
PREROGATIVES
Perhaps Richard’s largest error was his assumption that the PTD
encourages courts to substitute “their policy judgment regarding the proper
level of environmental protection for that of the legislature or executive
branch.”39 He was particularly critical of courts’ ability to fashion appropriate
remedies in cases seeking to invoke the PTD to curb greenhouse gas
emissions, claiming that courts would have to make “fundamental social and
economic and policy judgments” inappropriate for the judiciary.40
Richard mischaracterized how the PTD actually functions. The Mono
Lake decision is again illustrative. In the process of affirming that recreation
and ecological values, including air quality, were within the scope of the
PTD, the California Supreme Court made no attempt at policy judgments; it
merely directed the state to reconsider the balance between diversionary
uses and instream uses, requiring a calibration of costs and benefits and
tradeoffs.41 It took over a decade, but the state water agency in 1994 finally
did the balancing the court ordered, and the results were a partial
restoration of Mono Lake and a revolution in water conservation in Los
Angeles.42 The invocation of the PTD thus did not involve the court in the
policy balancing; that was the chore of the state water agency. As in Mono
Lake, the PTD often functions as a vehicle for courts to require agencies to
exercise their discretion, as Joe Sax anticipated all those years ago.43
The Mono Lake decision also serves as a reminder that the PTD is much
more than a common law doctrine. It is a doctrine of sovereign ownership.
That implies not only sovereign authority, but also sovereign duties. As the
California Supreme Court ruled, the PTD imposed an affirmative duty to
“attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize harm” to trust resources.44
This duty requires the state to exercise a “continuous supervision” of trust
resources and actions that affect them.45 And the duty, as the case illustrated,
was publicly enforceable.46
39
40

Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, supra note 4, at 1152.
Id. at 1156; See also id. at 1159 (doubting that judges are “remotely competent” to take

the place of deadlocked legislators).
41 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 727–29 (Cal. 1983).
42 See Brian E. Gray, Ensuring the Public Trust, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 973, 994–97 (2012)
(describing the 1994 decision as setting a goal of restoring the lake level by 18 feet, curtailing
LA’s diversions, establishing minimum flow criteria for the tributary feeder streams, and
determining that the city could make up its losses through a combination of increased
groundwater pumping, water purchases, water transfers, water conservation, and use of
reclaimed wastewater); Nash, supra note 26 (observing that despite adding over a million
residents Los Angeles uses less water than it did nearly a half-century ago).
43 Sax, Natural Resource Law, supra note 7, at 518. Using the PTD as a vehicle for courts to
remand issues to the legislature is another means by which Professor Sax saw the doctrine as
performing a democratizing function without displacing the legislative function of more
representative branches. Id. at 559. See also Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, supra note 4, at 1160
(quoting Sax).
44 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712.
45
46

Id.
Id. at 716 n.11.
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In many states, although not California, the PTD has a constitutional or
statutory basis.47 In both Hawaii and Pennsylvania, the sites of two important
PTD decisions, the PTD has constitutional entrenchment.48 In those states,
Richard’s complaint that the PTD has no constitutional basis is clearly
inapt.49 In other places, the PTD may be embedded in a statehood act, such
as in Oregon and other states with statehood acts drawn from the language
of the Ordinance of 1787.50 In those states, it is not accurate to dismiss the
PTD as a common law doctrine capable of being subsumed by statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
Richard is a prominent environmental law scholar and perhaps the
leading academic environmental lawyer before the United States Supreme
Court. But after he published his tenure piece some thirty years ago,51 he has
not closely followed PTD developments. Although he does appreciate the
utility of the PTD as a governmental defense to regulatory takings claims,52
he fails to see that the PTD is not merely a useful takings defense, but is also
an affirmative means of preventing monopolization of important public
resources, going back to the Supreme Court’s foundation case of Illinois
Central Railroad v. Illinois53 120 years ago.54

47 See, e.g., Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past &
Charting Its Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 685 (2012) (using Nevada and Pennsylvania as

examples of constitutional basis for PTD, and Vermont as an example of statutory basis);
Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating
Standards, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 699 passim (2006) (discussing the role of the PTD in
constitutional and statutory interpretation).
48 See Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 443 (Haw. 2000) (“The plain reading of these provisions
manifests the framers’ intent to incorporate the notion of the public trust into our
constitution.”); Robinson Twp. v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 954–56 (Pa. 2013) (“This
environmental public trust was created by the people of Pennsylvania, as the common owners
of the Commonwealth’s public natural resources; this concept is consistent with the ratification
process of the constitutional amendment delineating the terms of the trust.”). For further
discussion of Robinson Township, see John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a
Constitutional Public Trust, 45 ENVTL. L. 463 passim (2015).
49 Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, supra note 4, at 1155–56.
50 Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, reprinted in 1 U.S.C., at LVII
(2012) [hereinafter Northwest Ordinance]. The argument that the Act of Feb. 14, 1859 (Oregon
Statehood Act), ch. 33, § 2, 11 Stat. 383, 383 (1859), established the PTD is made in an amicus
brief in a case pending before the Oregon Court of Appeals, alleging that the state breached its
fiduciary duty in failing to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Brief for Law Professors, as
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 9, Chernaik v. Brown, No. A159826 (Or. Ct. App filed
Feb. 25, 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2720012. The Oregon Statehood Act’s
language that the navigable waters in the state would be “common highways and forever free,”
section 2, was drawn from article IV of the Northwest Ordinance, the foundation of six Midwest
States, from Michigan to Minnesota. See generally Mathew J. Festa, Property and
Republicanism in the Northwest Ordinance, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 409, 461 (2014) (recognizing the
importance of the Northwest Ordinance in establishing the PTD).
51 Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property, supra note 3.
52 Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, supra note 4, at 1150–52.
53 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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Properly understood, the PTD’s sovereign ownership is not only a
defense for government regulators, but an antidote to government inaction,
preventing privatization and calling for protection of select resources to
preserve them for the beneficiaries: the public, including future generations.
My hope is that Richard will come to see the functions served by the modern
PTD, and that PTD advocates may count upon him for support if a PTD case
reaches the United States Supreme Court.

54 See Michael C. Blumm & Lynn S. Schaffer, The Federal Public Trust Doctrine:
Misinterpreting Justice Kennedy and Illinois Central Railroad, 45 ENVTL. L. 399, 402 (2015)
(analyzing the effect of Illinois Central Railroad on the PTD).
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